In modal logic, when adding a syntactic property to an axiomatisation, this property will semantically become true in all models, in all situations, under all circumstances. For instance, adding a property like K a p → K b p (agent b knows at least what agent a knows) to an axiomatisation of some epistemic logic has as an effect that such a property becomes globally true, i.e., it will hold in all states, at all time points (in a temporal setting), after every action (in a dynamic setting) and after any communication (in an update setting), and every agent will know that it holds, it will even be common knowledge. We propose a way to express that a property like the above only needs to hold locally: it may hold in the actual state, but not in all states, and not all agents may know that it holds. We achieve this by adding relational atoms to the language that represent (implicitly) quantification over all formulas, as in ∀p(K a p → K b p). We show how this can be done for a rich class of modal logics and a variety of syntactic properties. We then study the epistemic logic enriched with the syntactic property 'knowing at least as much as' in more detail. We show that the enriched language is not preserved under bisimulations. We also demonstrate that adding public announcements to this enriched epistemic logic makes it more expressive, which is for instance not true for the 'standard' epistemic logic S5.
Introduction
Modal logic has become the framework for formalising areas in computer science and artificial intelligence as diverse as distributed computing [14] , reasoning about programs [15] , verifying temporal properties of systems [17] , game theoretic reasoning [25] , and specifying and verifying multi-agent systems [31] . Regarding the latter example alone, since Moore's pioneering work [19] on knowledge and action, agent theories like intention logic [5] and BDI [20] use modal logic (where the modalities represent time, action, informational attitudes like knowledge or belief, or motivational attitudes like desires or intentions) to analyse interactions between modalities, like perfect recall, no-learning, realism, or different notions of commitment. As for epistemic modal logic, since the seminal work of Hintikka [16] , modal epistemic logic has played a key role in knowledge representation, witnessed by the literature on reasoning about knowledge in computer science [7] , and artificial intelligence [18] . The current activities in dynamic epistemic logic [1, 27] can be seen as providing a modal logical analysis in the area of belief revision, thereby providing it with a natural basis for multi-agent belief revision, giving an account of the change of higher order information, and capturing this all in one and the same object language: a modal language, indeed.
The popularity of modal logic in those areas is partly explained by its appealing semantics: the notion of state is a very powerful one when it comes to modeling computations of a machine, or describing possibilities that an agent thinks/desires/fears to be possible. Another strong feature of modal logic is its flexibility: the fact that temporal, dynamic, informational and motivational attitudes can be represented by modalities does not mean that they all satisfy the same laws. Rather, depending on the interpretation one has in mind, one can decide to either embrace or abandon certain principles for each of the modalities used. Syntactically, this means one assumes a number of axioms or inference rules for a modality or for the interaction of some modalities, and more often than not, this semantically corresponds to assuming some specific properties of the associated accessibility relations in the corresponding models.
In the context of epistemic logic for instance, adding specific modal axioms allows one to specify that the knowing agent is veridical (K a p → p): if agent a knows that p, then p must be true), or that he is positively (K a p → K a K a p) or negatively (¬K a p → K a ¬K a p) introspective. Those axioms happen to correspond (in a precise way: correspondence theory for modal logic is already some decades old, cf. [23] ) to reflexivity, transitivity and Euclidicity of the associated accessibility relation R a , respectively. Moreover, the axioms are canonical for it: adding the syntactic axiom to a modal logic enforces the canonical model for the logic to have the corresponding property, which then in turn implies that completeness of the logic with respect to the class of models satisfying that relational property is guaranteed. At this point, it is important to note the difference between K a p → p as a formula and that as a scheme, or axiom: as a formula, it merely expresses that regarding the atom p, agent a does not know it without it being true. However, when we assume it as an axiom, or as a scheme, it means that we declare it to hold for every substitution instance of p, in other words, we assume that for all formulas ϕ, the implication K a ϕ → ϕ holds.
It is often argued (indeed, already by Hintikka in [16] ) that a distinguishing feature between knowledge and belief is that whereas knowledge is veridical, belief need not be, i.e., the scheme B a p → p should not be assumed as an axiom for belief. This then simply entails that epistemic logics have veridicality as an axiom, and doxastic logics have not. Semantically speaking: the accessibility relations denoting knowledge are reflexive, those denoting belief need not be. But how then to deal with a situation where we want to express that "currently, a's beliefs happen to be true"? If we add B a p → p as an axiom to our logic, the effect is that in all models (with respect to which the logic is complete), and in all states, all instances of that axiom are true, i.e., for all models M , for all states s and for all formulas ϕ, we then have M, s |= B a ϕ → ϕ. Given a model M and a state s we can express that a's belief that an individual proposition q holds is correct: M, s |= B a q ∧ q. And we can express that a's belief about q is correct: M, s |= (B a q → q) ∧ (B a ¬q → ¬q). But what we cannot express in modal logic is that B a ϕ → ϕ holds for all ϕ in one state, without claiming at the same time it should hold throughout the model. As a consequence, we cannot express in the object language that agent b thinks that agent a's beliefs are correct, while agent c believes that a is wrong about a proposition q. The closest one gets to expressing that would be to say that for all ϕ, in M, s we have M, s |= B b (B a ϕ → ϕ)∧B c ((B a q ∧¬q)∨(B a ¬q ∧q)) (but here, the quantification over ϕ is on a meta-level, and not in the scope of B b ). Neither can we say, in a temporal doxastic context, that a's beliefs now are correct, but tomorrow they need not be.
To give another example of the same phenomenon, suppose one adds the scheme K a p → K b p to a modal logic (b knows everything that a knows). Semantically, this means R b ⊆ R a . If the logic is about a set of agents A, then it becomes common knowledge among A that b knows at least what a knows! And if there is a notion of time, we have that it will always be the case that b knows at least what a knows, and, when having modalities for actions, it follows that no action can make it come about that a has a secret for b, in particular, it is impossible to inform a about something that b does not already know-this rules out dynamics which are, in contrast, very possible in dynamic epistemic logic.
So, the general picture in modal logic that we take as our starting point is the following. One has a modal logic to which one adds an axiom scheme θ (say, B a p → p). If one is lucky, the scheme corresponds to a relational property Θ(x) (in the case above, Rxx). However, adding θ to the logic means having Θ(x) true everywhere, implying that θ is always true. What we are after is looking at ways to enforce the scheme θ locally. To do so, we will add a marker to the modal language, such that is true locally, in a state s, if and only if Θ is true, locally (i.e., Rss holds).
In [28] , in the context of a multi-agent logic S5, this is done for the scheme 'knowing at least as much as'. The expression a b in [28] , when true at w means formally 'a considers at least as many accessible worlds from w as b', and informally 'a is at least as uncertain as b about the actual state of affairs at w', is an example of such a marker (a, b), named Sup(a, b) here, and in this case Θ(a, b)(x) is the property ∀y(R b xy ⇒ R a xy). The results of [28] are generalised in [29] to more general modal logics K(+ϕ 1 , . . . , +ϕ n ) for formulas ϕ i satisfying some additional condition, and this is also the main focus of our current contribution.
It is also possible to add several markers at the same time. This then enables that not only can we make global properties locally true, but it also allows for more subtle quantifications over formulas than is allowed in modal logic. This makes it possible to express properties like "If all of John's beliefs are correct, than so must Mary's beliefs be", or "If John knows now everything that Mary knows, then that must have been true yesterday as well" or "If John's beliefs are correct, then he must know that Mary's beliefs are correct as well". The quantification needed for the latter -∀ϕ(B j ϕ → ϕ) → K j ∀ψ(B m ψ → ψ) -cannot even be achieved by adding an axiom! For more examples of such quantification, see Section 2.1. This paper is organised as follows. In Section 1.1 we outline our approach towards a modal logic with local schemes and we explain how, for a variety of property schemes θ, one can enforce them to be locally true. To understand our approach, one needs to carefully distinguish between three formal languages, which we formally define in Section 2. Then, in Section 3, we provide a general way to enrich a modal logic with relational atoms, in such a way that the resulting logic is sound and complete with respect to models where those atoms define, in a local sense, to a first order property. In Section 4 we then zoom in on the specific relational atom a b, which locally specifies that R a ⊇ R b . In particular, we give the modalities in this section an epistemic interpretation, so that a b captures K a p → K b p as a local property, i.e., we study such a scheme locally within a modal epistemic logic. Finally, in Section 5 we summarise and conclude.
Towards a Modal Logic with Local Schemes
In this paper, we describe two languages to reason about Kripke models. The place where these languages meet is important for our set-up. Let us outline the overall approach with the aim of an example: formal definitions follow in Section 2. First of all, we are interested in a modal scheme θ(a, b, p), which in our example reads [a]p → [b]p in a modal language L (generally, we write [a]ϕ for modal formulas, but for epistemic interpretations we may write K a ϕ, and for doxastic ones B a ϕ). To the modal language we add a relational atom (a, b), or, in this specific case Sup(a, b), which will be true in a state s iff ∀y(R b sy ⇒ R a sy) holds. The latter property is a formula Θ(a, b)(s) in a first-order language L 1 . Our modal logic should now formalise the idea that θ(a, b, p) and (a, b) 'capture the same'. Indeed, we will add (a, b) → θ(a, b, p) (in our example:
as an axiom to the logic. However, we will argue that one cannot just add the opposite direction as an axiom. Instead, the logic will take on an inference rule that ensures that something along the following lines holds: consistency of a formula ϕ with an occurrence of ¬ (a, b) is the same as consistency of ϕ with the occurrence of ¬ (a, b) replaced by ¬θ(a, b, p) (where p is a fresh atom). For completeness of the logic, we then take care that in its canonical model, the truth of θ(a, b, p) in a specific world (i.e., maximal consistent set ∆) coincides with property Θ(∆).
The languages that we define are simple extensions of languages usually studied in standard modal logic [3, 4] . More specifically, our modal logic extends that of modal logic with some relational atoms , and the first order language is the standard language to reason about properties of accessibility relations. Our completeness proof, in turn, is an extension of 'standard' completeness proofs in modal logic: we sometimes have to add fresh atoms p to ensure that θ(a, b, p) is satisfied. We have borrowed ideas from [6] to prove our Extension Lemma 2 and ideas from [9, 10, 11, 21] to make this lemma work 'everywhere in the canonical model'. Finally, from [11, 12] we borrow the notion of r-persistence (imposed on θ ( a, p) here) to make our completeness proof work.
Language and Semantics
As outlined above, we deal with two languages, which are all interpreted over the same objects, i.e., Kripke models. The languages are an extended modal language L, and a first order language L 1 . For both languages, we assume a (finite, although this is not crucial for our results) set of modality labels A = {a 1 , . . . , a |A| }. In the modal language, these will give rise to modalities [a] , and in the other language, we assume to have a binary relation R a for each a ∈ A. For the latter language, we also assume to have a set of variables X = {x, y, . . . }. The variables will range over possible worlds: note that in L 1 we do not assume to have constants. For the modal language L we assume a finite set ρ = { 1 , 2 , · · · m } of relational atoms: they are nothing else than atomic symbols of which the truth depends on local properties of accessibility relations (see the function I in Definition 1). Therefore, we will often write (a 1 , . . . , a n ) rather than to make this dependence clear, and treat as if it were an n-ary relational predicate (rather than an atomic symbol). Our languages will be denoted L(A, π, ρ) (the modal language), and L 1 (A, X ) (the first order language). If the parameters for the languages are clear, we will also write L, and L 1 , respectively.
Definition 1 (modal language). Let the sets A, π, and ρ be as described above. The modal language L(A, π, ρ) is defined as follows:
where a, a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ A, p ∈ π and is an n-ary relational atom in ρ. Formula a ϕ is shorthand for ¬[a]¬ϕ and we also assume the usual definitions for disjunction, implication and bi-implication. If the modality is an epistemic one, the labels denote agents, and we write K a ϕ rather than [a]ϕ. For a doxastic interpretation we write B a ϕ, etc.
A formula without occurrences of relational atoms is called a purely modal formula. Suppose we have a multi-modal formula θ(a 1 , . . . , a n , p 1 , . . . p k ) where a 1 , . . . , a n are labels of modalities [a 1 ], . . . [a n ] and p 1 , . . . , p k are atoms. We will write a for the tuple a 1 , . . . , a n and p for p 1 , . . . , p k . When we write a ∈ a we mean that a is one of the labels occurring in the tuple a, likewise for p and p. Finally, for any tuple x = x 1 , . . . , x n with each x i taken from some set X, we will write x ∈ X.
Definition 2 (first order language). Let A and X be given. First define a language L + (A, X ):
with a ∈ A, and x, y ∈ X . Now, our first order language L 1 (A, X ) is the onefree-variable sublanguage of L + , i.e., the sublanguage of L + consisting of all formulas with one variable not in the scope of a quantifier. If Θ ∈ L 1 (A, X ) has x as its only free variable, and if a 1 , . . . a n are all the modality labels occurring in Θ, we will also write Θ( a)(x) for Θ.
As mentioned earlier, both languages will be interpreted over Kripke models.
Definition 3 (Kripke models and frames). • W is a set of possible worlds, also called states;
• R : A → ℘(W × W ) assigns a binary relation to each modality label
) assigns a first order property to each relational atom in ρ
• V : π → ℘(W ) assigns a set of possible worlds to each propositional variable
Rather then (w, v) ∈ R(a) we will write R a wv. For M = W, R, I, V and w ∈ W , we let R a (w) denote {v ∈ W | R a wv}. A Kripke frame is a tuple F = W, R, I such that M, V = W, R, I, V is a model. The 'arity' of a symbol ∈ ρ can be read off from its interpretation I( ): if I( ) refers to modalities a 1 , . . . , a n , then we may write ( a) for . A pointed Kripke model is a pair (M, w) where w ∈ W is a designated point ('the actual world'); we often delete the parentheses around it. We will sometimes use the terminology of I-models and I-frames to highlight the additional interpretation I compared to 'standard' ( [3] ) Kripke models.
Definition 4 (semantics of modal formulas). Let A and π be given. Also, let M = W, R, I, V . Then we define, for ϕ ∈ L(A, π, ρ):
The class of all models over A, π and ρ is denoted K(A, π, ρ). All models with interpretation I are denoted K(A, π, ρ, I). Validity of ϕ in a model M (denoted by M |= ϕ) is defined as usual. Moreover, K(A, π, ρ) |= ϕ means that for all models M = W, R, I, V over A, π and ρ, we have M |= ϕ. If F = W, R, I is a frame, F, w |= ϕ is defined as: for all valuations V, W, R, I, V , w |= ϕ. To distinguish our models and frames from how they are usually defined in modal logic, we will sometimes refer to them as I-models and I-frames, respectively.
Interpretation of
, we assume that P (s) holds for a predicate P iff s ∈ V (p). In other words, the link between a propositional atom and a unary predicate is implicit by using lower-case and upper-case notation. is a sequence a or (a, b) or (a, b, c) of modality labels, and p is either the single atom p or the sequence p, q. Θ( a)(x) is a property of a state x, and ( a) is a name in the object language such that ( a) holds at w iff Θ( a)(w) holds of M .
Example 1. We give three examples: more are provided in Table 1 .
saying that in the current world w, the set of a-successors of w is a superset of the set of b-successors of w. If this is the interpretation of (a, b), we will also write Sup(a, b). 2. As a second example, take = (a) to be such that I( (a))(x) = R a xx.
Note that B a (a) can hence be interpreted as 'a believes that his beliefs are correct', since M, w |= B a (a) does entail that for all ϕ, M, w |= B a (B a ϕ → ϕ) (but see Remark 1). 3. Finally, take (a, b, c) with I( (a, b, c))(x) = ∀y∀z((R a xy &R b yz) ⇒ R c xz). We will write Trans(a, b, c) for Θ(a, b, c). Of course, a special case of this is = (a, a, a) saying that currently, at world w, the relation R a is transitive. Remark 1. Take (a) and M such that I( (a)) = ∀xR a xx. Note that although M, w |= (a) entails that agent a's beliefs are correct, the converse is not true, as the following example shows (see Figure 1 ). Let M = W, R, I, V be such that W = {w, u}, and R a = {(w, u), (u, w)}. Moreover, assume that for all p, w ∈ V (p) iff u ∈ V (p). Since (M, w) and (M, u) are bisimilar models ([4, Chapters 1 and 5]), we have M, w |= ϕ iff M, u |= ϕ, and hence M, w |= B a ϕ → ϕ, for all purely modal ϕ. However, since (w, w) ∈ R a , we have M, w |= ¬ ( a).
Note that, since Θ( a)(w) does not refer to atomic propositions p (or, rather predicates P ), we have that Θ( a)(w) holds in the model M = W, R, I, V iff Θ( a)(w) holds in the frame F = W, R, I . Definition 5.
1. Let ϕ ∈ L(A, π, ρ), and Φ some property which applies to states in a frame.
(a) We say that ϕ defines the frame property Φ if for every frame F = W, R, I we have F |= ϕ iff Φ holds of F . (b) ϕ is said to locally define Φ(x) if for every frame F and every w ∈ W , we have F, w |= ϕ iff Φ(w) holds in F . 2. Let θ ( a, p) be a purely modal formula, ( a) ∈ ρ and Θ( a)(x) a first order property. If θ ( a, p) locally defines Θ( a)(x) and I is such that I( ( a)) = Θ( a)(x), then we say that I semantically links θ ( a, p) and ( a) through Θ( a)(x).
Item 1 of Definition 5 generalises a definition of [12, page 180,181 ] to Iframes. Our completeness proof relies on even a stronger notion, although there we restrict ourselves to the case of first order properties (i.e., item 2 of Definition 5). The notions defined in the first item are also known as correspondence (between a modal formula and some, usually, first order property). There is in fact a rich literature on modal correspondence theory: see for instance the early [23] , the chapter on local correspondence in the later [24] and the more recent [4, Chapter 1] and [3, Chapter 3] and the references therein.
Take the specific example in a doxastic context where Θ(a)(x) is R a xx, and I( (a)) = Θ(a). Note that θ(a, p) = (B a p → p) defines Θ(a)(x) but still, as shown in Remark 1, the formulas (a) and θ(a, p) are not equivalent. Still, the two should be strongly connected, in a sense we will explain in Section 3. We first look at an example, involving our extended modal language.
A Simple Example
Consider five friends, Joey, Chandler, Ross, Monica and Phoebe (or j, c, r, m and p, for short). In this example, we use 'think' and 'believe' for the same thing. Joey believes that Monica's beliefs are at least as accurate as Ross' beliefs, i.e., Joey believes that if Ross' beliefs are correct, so must Monica's be (A). Joey also believes that Monica thinks that Chandler believes anything that Monica believes (B). Although Joey does not think that he believes everything he knows (he thinks that he knows he cannot find a job as an actor, but at the same time cannot believe it), he actually believes anything he knows (C). Moreover, Joey thinks that Chandler's beliefs are consistent (D). Finally, Joey happens to know that Monica believes that Phoebe is in competition with her for Chandler's attention, but at the same time Joey thinks that Chandler believes that Phoebe is not in competition with Monica for his attention (E). Then, we conclude that Joey believes that Ross' beliefs are not guaranteed to be correct (F ), or, better, that Joey believes he may assume that some formula is believed by Ross, but not true (F ).
We first give a (semi-formal) formalisation of our assumption using a modal logic that allows for quantification over formulas. Let z represent the proposition that Joey cannot find himself a job as an actor, and let q be the proposition that Phoebe is in competition with Monica for Chandler's attention. This formalisation is given in Table 2 , where assumption (A) in our informal description is represented as (a), etc. The formalisation in our language L(A, π, ρ) follows in Table 3 .
We can now be more precise about what it means that our language can do more than just formalising a local version of a global property. For instance, the global property B a p → p will have a local counterpart Refl (a). Locally, this will denote something that is similar to ∀ϕ(B a ϕ → ϕ). But if one looks at our formalisation (a) as given in Table 2 , which is our formalisation of the assumption (A) that was given at the beginning of this example, i.e.,
That (a) and (g) are not equivalent, can be seen in the model M, w of Figure 2 , where (a) is true in M, w, but (g) is not: for the latter, ϕ = p provides a counter-example. That (a) is true in M, w is easily seen from realising that a is formalised by a in Table 3 . We then formalise the same episode using the relational atoms ( a) introduced in Table 1 , which results in Table 3 . Abusing the language somewhat, we write Sup(kj, j) for the relational atom corresponding to K j ϕ → B j ϕ-from a language point of view, K j and B j are simply two different modal operators, say [kj] and [i], respectively.
Axiomatization
The aim of this section is to provide an axiomatisation for modal logics that are enriched with some relational atoms 1 ( a 1 ), . . . , m ( a m ), such that 
for every k (k ≤ m), there is a modal formula θ k ( a, p) such that, at least on frames, the two 'mean the same thing'. In fact, the logic K(A, π, ρ, I) that we define should be sound and complete with respect to K(A, π, ρ, I), so our aim for our logic is that for all formulas ϕ ∈ L(A, π, ρ), the notions K(A, π, ρ, I) ϕ and K(A, π, ρ, I) |= ϕ coincide. The idea to achieve this is as follows. In order to characterise the 'meaning' of ( a), we first like to specify what follows from it ('elimination of ( a)'): this will be specified by axiom Ax in Table 4 . Secondly, we need to characterise when one can derive that ( a) ('introduction of ( a)'), which is our inference rule R in that table. To make this all work, we moreover rely on a first order property Θ( a) that can be used as the interpretation of ( a), and which is locally defined by θ ( a, p). It will turn out that finding such a property is not easy or indeed possible for all θ ( a, p), so we will need to impose an additional condition on it: this will be done in Definition 11. This condition may look rather ad-hoc, but, as we will mention in Section 3.3, it is implied by a well-known property of local r-persistence. We will provide a formal soundness and completeness result for our logic, and will discuss connections with related approaches and techniques in Section 3.3.
Before plunging in the technical details, in order to get a feel for our axiomatisation, it pays off to recall that a formula of the form ( a) is a label (like Sup(a, b)), which represents both a modal formula
and a first-order property Θ( a)(x) (like ∀y(R b xy ⇒ R a xy)).
This is a good point to remind ourselves of the axiomatisation of the ∀ quantifier in first order logic. Formulated in our context (and quantifying over atomic variables), it has an axiom and an inference rule (let us for simplicity assume that p coincides with p, i.e., we only have one atom in θ ( a, p)):
where P does not occur inΓ
Our axiomatisation is then obtained by (i) chosing ( a) for θ ( a, p) and (ii), adding a 'modal component' to the inference rule, which ensures that θ ( a, p) may be replaced by ( a) 'anywhere in the model'.
We now explain our axiom and inference rule in pure modal logic terms, as follows. First of all, suppose that for every relational atom ( a) and fixed interpretation I we have a formula θ ( a, p) such that θ ( a, p) defines I( ( a)). Then, for each ( a) and related θ ( a, p) we add an axiom Ax , which is ( a) → θ ( a, p) to our logic K(A, π, ρ, I). This makes sense, given Ax ∀ and our observation above that ( a) is equivalent to ∀PΘ( a, P )(x), and the instancê Θ( a, P)(x) corresponds to the modal formula θ( a, p).
Adding the other direction as an implication does not work, as the example
is not a validity: the antecedent may be true due to some specific choice of p. Note that the modal reading of the rule R ∀ in our language would give
where p does not occur in ϕ
The rule R will indeed be derivable in our logic, but we need a little bit more. We will argue how to obtain R and its generalisation, R , by going back to the semantics of our modal language. Suppose that
, where p does not occur in ϕ. This then means that ϕ must entail that (locally) all b-successors are a-successors, i.e., K(A, π, ρ, I) |= ϕ → Sup(a, b), because if the latter would not hold, there would be a model M = W, R, I, V such that M, w, |= ϕ∧¬Sup(a, b). But since p does not occur in ϕ, we could then change the valuation V for p freely without changing that of ϕ, in particular we can choose V such that x ∈ V (p) iff R a wx (and V (q) = V (q) for atoms q = p). It is easy to see that in the resulting model M = W, R, I, V we have
This means that we need to be able to infer the following in K(A, π, {Sup(a, b)}, I):
where p ∈ ϕ
The rule (1) Prop All instances of propositional tautologies
(it will not be because of specific requirements on p imposed by ϕ) and hence we must have ϕ → Sup(a, b) holding at s as well. But in fact we can do the same reasoning that involves successors of s:
Then (in the same way as for s), we must have M, t |= ϕ → Sup(a, b). In other words, the following should hold for K(A, π, {Sup(a, b)}, I):
where p ∈ ϕ And the same should hold for all R d -successors u of all R c -successors t of s, etc. To formalise that a property θ ( a, p) holds after arbitrary sequences , p) ) . . . ), we follow [28] and introduce pseudo modalities: we will then present an inference rule R for every ∈ ρ to our axiomatisation K(A, π, ρ, I).
Definition 6 (Pseudo-modalities). We define the following pseudo-modalities, which are (possibly empty) sequences s = () or s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ), where each s i is a formula or a modality label. The formula s ϕ represents an L(A, Π, ρ) formula, as follows (we will omit parentheses around non-empty sequences when they occur with a diamond or box):
We also define [s]ϕ as ¬ s ¬ϕ. We say that p does not occur in s (and write p ∈ s) if none of the atoms p occurring in p does occur in any of the formulas s i in s.
Definition 7 (Proof system). Fix A, π and ρ. Then, Table 4 comprises the axioms and inference rules of the logic K(A, π, ρ, I).
In this table MP stands for Modus Ponens, Nec for Necessitation, and US for Uniform Substitution (ϕ[ψ/p] stands for substitution of ψ for every occurrence of p in ϕ). If ( a) and θ ( a, p) are connected through the axiom Ax and inference rule R , we say they are axiomatically linked (through axiom Ax and rule R ). If there is a derivation of a formula ϕ from a set of formulas Γ using Γ and the axioms and inference rules from K(A, π, ρ, I) we write Γ K(A,π,ρ,I) ϕ, or Γ K ϕ, for short.
. And the inference rule R becomes:
Lemma 1. Let p be a sequence of atoms not occurring in ϕ. Then rule R is an instance of R obtained with s = (), and R is equivalent to R 1 and R 2 :
Proof. We only show that axiom Ax and rule R 1 are valid, the latter demonstrating validity of R : all the other axioms and rules are standard. Starting with Ax , take a model M = W, R, I, V , where I is a parameter of the logic, and W, R and V are arbitrary. If M, w |= ( a), this means that I( ( a))(w) holds. Since θ ( a, p) characterises I( ( a)), we get M, w |= θ ( a, p).
Next, we will argue that, if p does not occur in s and ϕ, then
First of all, note that we can assume that s never needs two successive agents a and b (we can separate them with ) and neither does s need two successive formulas (we can replace them by their conjunction). Moreover we can assume that s is either empty or else starts with a modality (a possible condition can be added to ϕ). If s = (), then the assumption says that ¬ ( a) ∧ ϕ is satisfiable. That is, there is a model M = W, R, I, V and a state w ∈ W such that M, w |= ¬ ( a) ∧ ϕ. The first part of this conjunction says that ¬I( ( a))(w).
Since θ ( a, p) locally defines I( ( a)), and, since p does not occur in ϕ, we can change the valuation V for p without changing the truth of ϕ. In other words, we can define a new model M = W, R, I, V where the truth of p ∈ p in M is such that it falsifies θ ( a, p), but if keeps the truth of ϕ unchanged. We have M , w |= ¬θ ( a, p) ∧ ϕ, demonstrating the satisfiability of s ¬θ ( a, p) ∧ ϕ. Now we use induction and assume that s = c, ψ · t, where ψ is a formula (not containing p), c an arbitrary modality, t a sequence (not containing p) and · denotes concatenation of sequences. Suppose c, ψ · t ¬ ( a) ∧ ϕ is satisfiable. This means that at some M, w, we have M, w |= ϕ and for some v with R c wv, M, v |= t ¬( a) ∧ ψ. Using induction, we get R c wv and M, v |= t ¬θ ( a, p) ∧ ψ,(with p ∈ ψ, t). Hence M, w |= c, ψ · t ¬θ ( a, p) ∧ ϕ.
Back to Our Example
To formalise the derivation of Table 3 , let the set of modalities representing the friends be A = {c, j, m, p, r}, let π = {q, z} and let ρ = {Refl (r), Refl (m), Sup(c, m), Ser (c), Sup(kj, j)} and those atoms are axiomatically linked with their 'natural' modal counterparts (see Table 1 and for Sup(kj, j) we take K j p → B j p). Let the resulting logic be K (A, π, ρ, I ).
First of all, from (c ) and Ax Sup(kj,j) we derive K j B m q → B j B m q. Together with (e ) this gives (e ): B j B m q ∧ B j B c ¬q. From (d ), i.e., B j Ser(c) and Ax Ser (c) , we get B j (B c ¬q → ¬B c q). Combining this with (e ) gives B j B m q ∧ B j ¬B c q, which is equivalent to B j ¬(B m q → B c q) (*).
From (b ) and Ax Sup(m,c) we derive B j B m (B m p → B c p), for any p (**). Now, take the formula ψ = (B m q → B c q). From (*) we have B j ¬ψ, and from (**) we conclude B j B m ψ. In other words, we found a formula ψ for which B j ¬(B m ψ → ψ). Now using the contrapositive of axiom Ax Refl(m) , we obtain B j ¬Refl (m), which, together with (a ), yields our conclusion (f ). Now one may wonder whether this also warrants the conclusion (f ). Note that we did find a formula ψ above for which we derived that Joe believes that Monica believes it wrongly, but this does not imply that Joey also believes that Ross is mistaken regarding ψ. Also, although we now have (f ), as should be clear from Remark 1, B j ¬Refl (r) and B j ¬∀ϕ(B r ϕ → ϕ) are not the same thing. However, what we do have is the following. Let ϕ be (a ) ∧ (b ) ∧ (c ) ∧ (d ) ∧ (e ), and let s be B j , then what we have proven now is
Which informally reads that, from our assumptions, we can derive that Joey believes that Ross considers the actual world not (doxastically) possible. If we now add (g ) = Ser (j) (Joey's beliefs are consistent) to our assumptions ϕ = ϕ ∧ (g ), we obtain from (3):
which, with rule R 1 , gives that, for any p not occurring in ϕ , ϕ ∧ M j (B r p ∧ ¬p) is consistent, i.e., we can assume that for some p, Joey considers it possible that Ross is mistaken in his beliefs regarding that p.
It is worth noting how the axiomatisation makes it possible that some relational atoms (and hence some first-order frame properties) only hold in the scope of a modal operator (like in property (a ) and (b ) for example): the axiom Ax and rule R do not require that some relational properties hold, they only specify what should be the case if they hold.
Completeness
In this section we show completeness of the axiomatisation, by the standard method of constructing a canonical model. However, to ensure that the points (maximal consistent sets) in this model are closed under the new inference rule (cf. rule R 1 ), we have to ensure that those sets are fully witnessed, as defined below. We also present a formulation of the condition that we need to impose on the formulas θ ( a, p) to make the completeness proof work: we will later, in Section 3.3 dwell on this condition further.
Definition 8.
A theory Γ is a set of formulas. For π a set of propositional atoms, Γ is a π-theory if all propositional atoms in Γ are from π. Given a logic L, a theory Γ is L-consistent if ⊥ cannot be derived from Γ using the axioms and inference rules of L. A theory Γ is a maximal L-consistent π-theory if it is consistent and no π-theory ∆ is L-consistent while at the same time Γ ⊂ ∆. For a logic K(A, π, ρ, I), a set of formulas Γ is a witnessed π-theory if for every ( a) and every s ¬ ( a) ∈ Γ, there are atoms p such that s ¬θ ( a, p) ∈ Γ, where ( a) and θ ( a, p) are axiomatically linked. If Γ is not witnessed, then a formula s ¬ ( a) for which there is no s ¬θ ( a, p) ∈ Γ, is called a defect for the theory Γ. Finally, Γ is said to be fully witnessed, if it is witnessed and for every formula of the form s ϕ, either that formula or its negation is in Γ.
Lemma 2 (Extension Lemma). Let Σ be a K(A, π, ρ, I)-consistent π-theory. Let π ⊇ π be an extension of π by a countable set of propositional variables. Then there is a maximal K(A, π , ρ, I)-consistent, witnessed π -theory Σ extending Σ.
Before we give a proof, we first define some languages. Definition 9. Let the set of agents A, the set of atoms π and the set of relational atoms ρ be fixed. Let L(A, π, ρ) be as in Definition 1. Let π 0 = {p 0 , p 1 , . . . } be a set of fresh atomic variables, i.e., π ∩π 0 = ∅ and let π = π ∪π 0 .
A theory ∆ ⊆ Σ is called an approximation if for some n it is a consistent π ntheory. For such a theory, and any number k, the sequence p = p n+1 , . . . , p n+k is a new sequence p for ∆ if n is the least number such that ∆ is a π n -theory.
Proof (of Lemma 2).
Assume an enumeration of ψ 0 , ψ 1 , . . . of all formulas of the form s ¬ ( a), where s is a pseudo modality and ( a) ∈ ρ. Define
} where p is a new sequence for ∆, and s ¬ ( a) is the first defect for ∆ if this exists ∆ otherwise Clearly, by Ax , the set ∆ + is consistent when ∆ is and hence, if ∆ is an approximation, so is ∆ + . To define the extension Σ of Σ, assume ϕ 0 , ϕ 1 , . . . to be an enumeration of the formulas in L ω , and define
By construction, Σ is a maximal K(A, π, ρ, I)-consistent, witnessed π -theory extending Σ.
Definition 10 (canonical model
) as follows, where π is as in Lemma 2: 
Here, the operation o is defined as follows. First of all, if ¬ϕ n is added to
Since Γ is witnessed, we have b, y n , s ¬θ ( a, p) ∈ Γ for some p, and we put
Clearly, Y is fully witnessed. We claim Y is consistent as well, for suppose not, that is, there is a finite set of formulas from Y that together imply ⊥. Let k be the biggest index for which we need a formula from Y k to derive this contradiction. Then we have (y k ∧ α) → ⊥, for some α in {σ | [b]σ ∈ Γ}, but this contradicts the facts that b y k ∧ [b]α ∈ Γ and that Γ is consistent. At this point, we should mention that although the definition of canonical model is similar to the standard definition in modal logic ( [3] ), the domain of the model of Definition 10 is not the set of all maximal consistent sets, rather, it is the set of all such sets that are witnessed. The consequences of this fact will be discussed in Section 3.3. To prove our coincidence lemma below, we will now assume that θ ( a, p) is locally good, in the following sense.
Definition 11. Let the logic K(A, π, ρ, I) be given, θ ( a, p) be a modal formula, ( a) ∈ ρ a relational atom, Θ( a)(x) a first order formula and I : ρ → L 1 (A, X ). Assume that ( a) and θ ( a, p) are connected through the axiom Ax and R . K(A, π, ρ, I ) be given as in Definition 7, and suppose for every ∈ ρ there are purely modal formulas θ ( a, p) and a first order formula Θ( a)(x) such that the tuple θ ( a, p), ( a), I, Θ( a(x) is in local harmony. Then K (A, π, ρ, I ) is sound and complete with respect to the class of K (A, π, ρ, I ) models.
1.
We say that θ ( a, p) is locally good for Θ( a)(x) iff
Theorem 2. Let the logic
Proof. Soundness is dealt with in Theorem 1. For completeness, let ϕ ∈ L(A, π, ρ) be such that K(A, π, ρ, I) ¬ϕ. By Lemma 2, {ϕ} can be extended to a maximal L ω -consistent witnessed theory Γ. By Lemma 4, we then have M c , Γ |= ϕ, and hence |= ¬ϕ which completes the proof.
Discussion and an extension of the completeness proof
In a nutshell, our completeness proof builds a model for maximal witnessed theories Γ. Every consistent formula ϕ can be embedded in such a theory, and the construction makes sure that for every s ¬ ( a) ∈ Γ, there are witnessing atoms p such that s ¬θ ( a, p) ∈ Γ. Our canonical model hence does not contain all maximal consistent sets, but only those that are fully witnessed. Such a model is called a thinned out canonical model in [12] .
In modal logics that extend K with an axiom ϕ, the completeness proof for K + ϕ typically builds the canonical model from all maximal consistent sets, and this construction works for axioms ϕ that are canonical for some first order property Φ(x). (see also [3, Chapter 5] for a further discussion). Completeness of K + ϕ is then obtained with respect to those frames of K that moreover satisfy Φ.
For our set-up, rather than canonicity, we require a property given in Definition 11. Note that our frames do not globally inherit the first order property Θ( a), but instead, at every point Γ in the canonical model where θ ( a, p) holds, we also have the property Θ( a).
It appears 1 there is a rich modal literature on proving completeness when having a thinned out canonical model like ours. A general way to prove completeness for such logics is presented in [12] (which in turn, is based on reports that appear as the first chapter in [11] ). We will not present the details here: it would involve the notion of general frames. Our proof shows that for the kind of model we define, the notion of θ ( a, p) being locally good (Definition 11) works to prove completeness. It might be cumbersome to check this notion for every θ ( a, p) separately, but luckily enough, from [12, 11] , it follows that our construction works for a class of formulas θ ( a, p) that are called locally r-persistent (again, this notion is defined in terms of general frames, we refer to [12, 11, 30] ). For an example of a formula that is canonical but not r-persistent, see [30] .
A systematic characterisation of (locally) r-persistent formulas is still lacking, but [22, Theorem 2.4.7] ensures that shallow formulas, i.e., modal formulas in which every occurrence of a propositional variable is in the scope of at most one modal operator are r-persistent. Moreover, [12, page 182] mentions that 'many well-known formula axiomatising natural frame conditions like reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity, linearity etc.ãre locally r-consistent'.
So the fact that r-persistence of θ ( a, p) implies that θ ( a, p) is locally good for some first order Θ( a)(x) implies that our completeness proof works whenever θ ( a, p) is r-persistent. It moreover guarantees the following 'modular' completeness result. Theorem 3. Consider the logic K (A, π, ρ, I ) and add a number of r-persistent formulas ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n as axioms to it: call the result K . Suppose ϕ i locally defines Φ i . Then K is complete with respect to frames that satisfy Φ i (i ≤ n).
Proof. For every axiom ϕ i , introduce a new relational atom ϕi which is added as an axiom to the logic, and also add an axiom and inference rule that axiomatically link ϕ i and ϕi . Our completeness proof works when having several relational atoms associated with a formula θ ( a, p) that is locally good for I( ). Since r-persistence of ϕ i implies being locally good for Φ i , we obtain a model such that every set Γ that contains ϕi satisfies Φ i (Γ), and moreover, since ϕi is added as an axiom, the whole model satisfies Φ. This completes the proof.
We will see an immediate application of Theorem 3 in the next section. Our inference rule R is reminiscent of an inference rule for irreflexivity [8] . This rule for irreflexivity triggered a flurry of papers on studying similar 'unorthodox rules'. We only mention here [11, 30, 12] , which establish some general completeness results, technically similar to the one presented here. The paper [30] calls such rules 'non-ξ rules' and [12] calls them 'context-dependent rules', because of the similarity between such rules and context-dependent rules in generating grammars. Also, our use of pseudo-modalities has ancestors: (often in combination with the kind of 'unorthodox rules' above), they are used in [12, 30] as 'universal forms', in [9] as 'admissible forms' and were already present as a prototype in [8] . They also play a similar role as does the 'pasting' of a subformula next to an occurrence of a specified one in [6] to prove the completeness of the D (difference) operator.
However, it is important to stress that the approaches mentioned aim to axiomatise global properties. As far as we know, the work presented in this paper is a first general approach to local properties in models. Although [12] also pays attention to local issues, all the frames obtained there are defined globally. Theorem 4.1 in [12] presents both a generalisation (it is not just about rules with relational atoms) and a specialisation (it is not about I-frames) of our Theorem 2. In our terminology, [12, Theorem 4 .1] supposes that we have a formula ϕ that locally defines α(x), and a formula ψ which is locally r-persistent and locally defining β(x). It then assumes an inference rule like R , where θ ( a, p) is replaced by ϕ and ( a) by ψ. If such a rule is added to a logic L which only has r-persistent axioms, then the resulting logic is sound and complete with respect to frames of L that moreover satisfy ∀x(α(x) → β(x)). In our case, the α and β are equivalent, so that indeed we keep the frames of the underlying logic L. In other words, our logic does not demand anything about a frame globally, it only requires that if locally all instances of θ ( a, p) are true, the 'corresponding' I( ( a)) must hold as well.
Outlook
We have so far assumed that the only properties of ( a) are those specified by the axiom A and rule R . However, one can add other connections between ( a) and modal formulas, or between different 1 ( a 1 ) and 2 ( a 2 ) atoms. For instance, in an epistemic logic, one could add the axiom scheme
Adding an axiom like (5) for an agent a has the effect that whenever a's knowledge is veridical, a is also positively introspective. I.e., we would have, semantically, that whenever M, s |= K a ϕ → ϕ, for all ϕ, then also M, s |= K a ϕ → K a K a ϕ, for all ϕ. This again is a property that cannot be expressed in standard, 'global' modal logic. As a second example, in an epistemic temporal modal logic, one could add an axiom like Trans(a, a, a) → ♦ (Trans(a, a, a) ∧ Eucl (a, a, a) ) (6) saying that whenever agent a is positively introspective, he will eventually also become negatively introspective. As a third example, a simple axiom like
in a doxastic setting would mean that whenever a's beliefs are consistent, those of b must be consistent as well. It is possible to view some standard results in modal logic concerning completeness of modal systems as special cases of our local logic. If the conditions of Theorem 2 are satisfied, and one adds a ( a) as an axiom, one immediately gets completeness with respect to the class of models that satisfy I (θ ( a, p) ). For instance, in a logic with axioms and rules for Refl (a), adding Refl (a) itself as an axiom gives a modal system that is sound and complete with respect to the class of reflexive Kripke models! Of course, this amounts to the same thing as adding θ ( a, p), as is directly clear from rule R (take α = ⊥).
Finally, it is important to realise that, although we presented the axioms for the underlying logic (the formulas ϕ i that we assumed to be canonical) and the relational atoms as two independent layers, the interaction properties between the modalities and the relational atoms may be automatically 'imported'. For the case of epistemic logic S5 with at least two agents and the Sup(a, b) atom for instance, one can derive that certain Sup(a, b) statements cannot go unnoticed by the agents! This will now be discussed in the next section.
Comparative (Epistemic) Logic
We will now focus on an example of a modal logic, called comparative logic (CL), which has one type of relational atom , namely Sup. From now on, we will write a b for Sup(a, b), and b a will denote the same. To motivate our notation, note that
We also write a b for ¬(a b). Moreover, we will write both a b and b ≺ a for (a b) ∧ ¬(b a). So a b means 'every a-successor is a b-successor', and a ≺ b means 'every a-successor is a b-successor, and some b-successor is not an asuccessor'. In the second part of this section, we will then interpret our formulas on multi-agent S5 models ('epistemic' models). So then a b stands for 'agent a considers a larger set of worlds possible than agent b', informally 'b knows at least as much as a'. We will start by adding the atom to the logic K(A, π, ρ, I). This is the logic CL: comparative logic. This is not yet an epistemic logic. and inference rule R :
Comparative Logic
which is equivalent to:
We write CL for derivability in CL(A, π). The language CL(A, π) of comparative logic is defined as L(A, π, { }).
Corollary 1. CL(A, π) is sound and complete with respect to K(A, π, ρ, I)
Proof. This follows directly from Theorem 2 on page 18.
In this weakest modal logic with the symbol , we can already derive 'expected' properties of : Proposition 1. The following holds:
. Applying the rule R to this gives CL ¬(a a) → ⊥. The latter is equivalent to CL a a. To further emphasise the non-standard behaviour of our modal language, we state two more negative (and one positive) results. First let us briefly revisit some modal semantic notions.
Definition 13. Given two models M = W, R, V and M = W , R , V , a relation R ⊆ W × W is called a bisimulation if the following holds: ('atomic') for all p ∈ P , if Rww then w ∈ V (p) iff w ∈ V (p) ('forth') if Rww and if for some v ∈ W and some a ∈ A one has R a wv, then there is a v ∈ W such that R a w v and Rvv and, finally ('back') if Rww and if for some v ∈ W and some a ∈ A one has R a w v , then there is a v ∈ W such that R a wv and Rvv . If there is a bisimulation between M and M with Rww', we write M, w ∼ = M , w .
A special case of a bisimulation is obtained by unraveling a model (M, w) into a model (M , w) as follows. Given W and a set of agents A let W be all the finite paths in M from w, i.e., states w in W are of the form w = w 1 , a 1 , w 2 , a 2 , . . . , w n , a n w n+1 such w 1 = w and for all i ≤ n, in M one has R ai w i w i+1 . Let lst(w ) = lst( w 1 , a 1 , w 2 , a 2 , . . . , w n , a n w n+1 ) = w n+1 (i.e., lst selects the last member of a finite list). Put w ∈ V (p) iff lst(w ) ∈ V (p), and R a w v if v = w 1 , a 1 , w 2 , a 2 , . . . , w n , a n w n+1 , a, u for some u ∈ W .
If there are no relational atoms we have a standard multimodal logical language: for L(A, π, ∅) we write L(A, π). In other words, compared to
is the language without the a b formulas.
Lemma 5.
all p ∈ π, if Rww then w ∈ V (p) iff w ∈ V (p) ('forth') if Rww and if for some v ∈ W and some C ⊆ A one has R C wv, there there is a v ∈ W such that R C w v and Rvv and, finally ('back') if Rww and if for some v ∈ W and some C ∈ A one has R C w v , there there is a v ∈ W such that R C wv and Rvv . If there is a coalitional bisimulation between M and M with Rww', we write M, w ∼ =coal M , w .
Let M, w with M = W, R, V be given. A coalitional unraveling of M is a model M , w with M = W , R , V , and where W consists of all paths w 1 , C 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n , C n , w n+1 such that w 1 = w and for all i ≤ n, one has R C w i w i+1 . V is defined as in the case for (ordinary) unravelings, and R C w v if v = w 1 , C 1 , w 2 , C 2 , . . . , w n , C n w n+1 , C, u for some u ∈ W and C ⊆ A.
Coalitional unravelings (M , w) of (M, w) respect access for coalitions of agents, in the following sense: for all C, R C w v iff R C lst(w )lst(v ). The proof of the following is now a straightforward extension of the proofs of items 1 and 2 of Lemma 5 and therefore omitted:
Theorem 4 (Preservation). We have the following.
Proof. A proof is needed, because the back and forth requirements for the bisimulation relation are not special cases of those for coalitional bisimulation, as R a is not the same as (in coalitional bisimulations) R {a} : the latter links states with only an a-arrow between them, the former links states with at least an a-arrow between them. Assume R coal : M, w ∼ =coal M , w . We show that also R coal : M, w ∼ = M , w . 'Atoms' is trivial. 'Forth': let a ∈ A, u ∈ M , and u ∈ M . Assume there is a v ∈ M such that R a uv and R coal uu . Agent a must occur in some coalition C for which R C uv (there is a C such that {a} ⊆ C ⊆ A and R C non-empty). From R C uv and R coal uu follows that there is a v ∈ M such that R C u v and R coal vv . From R C u v and a ∈ C follows R a u v . 'Back': similar.
The notion of coalitional bisimulation is in fact too strong to characterise preservation, i.e., the converse direction of item 1 of Theorem 4 does not hold. To see this, take the two models M, w 1 and M , w 1 of Figure 11 (in fact, all accessibility relations are equivalence relations: the formal definition of the models is in the proof of Theorem 8). We will argue in that proof that M, w 1 and M , w 1 satisfy the same formulas, but it is easy to see that they are not coalition bisimular: from w 1 , there is an {a}-successor that satisfies ¬p, but this is not true for w 1 , nor for w 2 . But this also suggest a trivial relaxation of our requirements for a coalitional bisimulation: in order for a state M , w to have the same theory as M, w 1 in Figure 11 , rather than requiring that M , w needs to have an {a}-successor to a ¬p world, we should require that (i) M , w is bisimular with M, w in the sense of Definition 13, and (ii), the formula b a is true in M , w (and it should agree with M, w 1 on all relevant -formulas).
Definition 15. Let the models M = W, R, I, V and M = W , R , I , V be two models for the same agents A, propositional variables π and relational atoms ρ. A relation R ⊆ W × W is called an extended bisimulation if
• R is a bisimulation (in the sense of Definition 13)
An extended bisimulation is moreover called natural if it also satisfies
As an example, consider the models M = W, R, I, V , M = W , R, I, V and M = W , R , I , V of Figure 4 . Let V, V and V be such that exactly the same propositional variables are true in all worlds. Suppose there is only one relational atom (a) in the language, and I( (a)(x)) = R a xx, I ( (a)(x)) = ∃!yR a xy and I ( (a)(x)) = R a xx. Then R = W ×W is an extend bisimulation that is not natural (in M , (a) is interpreted as R a being reflexive, in M as R a being functional), while R = W × W represents a natural extended bisimulation (in both models, (a) is interpreted as reflexivity). Note that for I ( (a)(x)) we could even have taken ¬I ( (a)(x) ). In particular, if N is an unraveling a model N with a reflexive or transitive relation R a , then the two models bisimulate each other non-naturally by taking for instance I( (a) to be Ref l(a) or T rans(a), and I its negation. To sum up, in an extended bisimulation, bisimulating worlds agree also on the truth of relational atoms, while in a natural extended bisimulation, bisimulating worlds moreover agree on the meaning of such atoms. The following is an easy extension of well-known results in modal logic. Note that it is about general languages L (A, π, ρ) , not just about the comparative language of CL(A, π).
Lemma 6. L(A, π, ρ) , i.e., if there is an extended bisimulation between M, w and M , w , then for all ϕ ∈ L(A, π, ρ), M, w |= ϕ iff M , w |= ϕ. 2. For finite models, we also have the converse: if two finite models agree on formulas form L(A, π, ρ), then there exists an extended bisimulation between them.
Extended bisimulations preserve
Proof. Similar to the modal case (cf. [3] ), when one treats relational atoms as propositional variables.
Comparative Epistemic Logic
We will now specialise our case study with (a, b) = a b to epistemic logic. We will write K a ϕ (rather than [a]ϕ) for 'agent a knows ϕ'. Moreover, M a ϕ will be short for ¬K a ¬ϕ.
So our language L({K a } a∈A , π, {a b} a,b∈A ), or L CEL for short, is defined as follows, where π is as described earlier.
Definition 16 (Comparative Epistemic Logic). Let CEL(A, π), comparative epistemic logic, be the logic that is obtained from CL(A, π) by adding the following three knowledge axioms.
Moreover, since we assume ρ = {a b | a, b ∈ A} we have the following specialised axiom and rule (see table 4 on page 12; we recall that s is a pseudomodality):
As in CL, we assume in CEL that I(a b) = ∀y(R b xy ⇒ R a xy) and, CEL(A, π) , we have axioms that guarantee that a b and K a p → K b p are axiomatically linked. We will write CEL for derivability in CEL(A, π).
Models for CEL(A, π) will be ordinary S5-models, i.e., models of the kind M = W, R, I, V with the constraint that for each a ∈ A, R a is an equivalence relation. Call this set of models S5(A, π, ρ, I). Proof. This follows directly from Theorem 3 and the observation that axiom T is r-persistent and defines reflexivity, axiom 4 if r-persistent and defines transitivity, and 5 r-persistent and defines Euclidicity (for the r-persistence argument, see [12] ). Moreover, a relation has those three properties iff it is an equivalence relation. Finally, Ax is also r-persistent, since it is shallow ( [22] ).
The technical results in the previous sections suggest that the infinite scheme
is captured by the formula a b. However, we have also seen that, would we allow for infinite conjunctions, then although we would have (a
, this implication can in general not be reversed. Related to this, it is worth noting that the notion of 'knowing more than' cannot be captured in the language of CEL. Although one might suspect that 'b knows more than a' is captured by a b, the latter only says that every state considered possible by b is also considered possible by a and, moreover, some states are considered possible by a and not by b. However, these latter states can all be bisimilar to states that both agents consider possible, in which case both agents would know the same.
The following Theorem summarises some of our discussion so far. 
Furthermore, let Φ(w) denote that at w, agent b knows strictly more than a:
a a a a a a a a a . This is true by definition for ϕ ∈ π, and it is also true for relational atoms: a b is true in all worlds, and b a is true in no world. The cases for negation, conjunction and knowledge formulas then follow directly. To conclude, we have (M, w) |= a b but Φ(w) is false in M . 4. See Figure 5 . We will not formally define the model M depicted in this figure, but it is easy to see that for all i, j ∈ Z, and all ϕ, we have M, x i |= ϕ iff M, x j |= ϕ. This is because the two models (M, x i ) and (M, x j ) are not just bisimilar, they are isomorphic! From this if follows that for all It would be interesting to study under which conditions the counter-examples that perfectly link and 'knowing at least as much', or between and 'knowing more' fade away, in other words, under which circumstances there is a perfect match between for instance and 'knowing more'. A natural condition for this seems to be the case where, for any agent a, and any world w, the set R a (w) is definable in L CEL , that is, where there is a formula χ a,w such that
It is easy to see how this addresses the negative results in Theorem 6. For item 2 for instance, if Ψ(w) holds, we have in particular M, w |= K a χ a,w → K b χ a,w and hence if R b wu, then M, u |= χ a,w and hence u ∈ R a (w), so that M, w |= a b.
Examples where definability of successors is guaranteed are for instance obtained if we restrict our attention to the case where the language has only finitely many atoms, and where the models are both image finite (every world has only finitely many successors) and strongly extensional (see [3] , this notion is also sometimes called bisimulation contraction), items 2 to 4 of Theorem 6 would not allow for a counter-example. Intuitively, a model is strongly extensional if it cannot contain fewer worlds without changing its information content, i.e.: removing a state would mean changing the truth of some formula in some other state. We leave a precise characterisation of classes of models where and 'knowing at least' exactly match, for future research.
In Proposition 1 we showed that some simple properties of can be already derived in CL. An obvious question is whether adding knowledge properties strict subset of a's alternatives, b knows this as well! This is particularly striking in cases where a and b in fact know the same (this is for instance true in (M, w) of Figure 6 ). In this model, note that agents a and b know the same in (M, w). However, although both agents know exactly the same, both agents also know that agent b considers less states possible than agent a! Item 2 then says that if b does not consider at most the states possible that a considers possible, b must know this. In sum, the first three items seem to suggest that no matter whether (i) b has at least the information as a has, or (ii) has more information than a, or (iii) does not have at least the information that a has, b will know this! Item 5 states that, for any agent b, if he compares his information state with an arbitrary agent a, then b will know whether he has at least the same information as a or not. The following representation of S5-models and the alternative notation when dealing with equivalence relations may also help the reader. 
The proof of item 3 of Theorem 7 is almost identical to that of the previous item: replace each occurrence of by and each occurrence of ⊇ by ⊃.
Where our first proof of Theorem 7 shows that transitivity and Euclidicity are sufficient to demonstrate the →-direction of the items 1 and 3, we finally show that they are also necessary: see Figure 8 . Concentrating now on the agent a that has less information (i.e., who considers at least the states possible that b considers possible), it turns out that a does not need to be aware of this. It seems somewhat 'unfair' that if a knows less than b, a does not necessarily know that -at least in a (fair!) game-like setting one would expect the opposite: player b may have an advantage (more information, more knowledge), but in order to place his bets player a should at least be aware of his disadvantage (ignorance) compared to b. On the other hand, considering that these are typically incomplete information games, from a's perspective it may be gambling the possibility of being less informed than b against the possibility of knowing more, which sounds more 'fair'. Example 4. Consider the model of Figure 9 consisting of three states, where a cannot distinguish t from u whereas b cannot distinguish s from t. In fact u is the case. In u it is true that a b -in fact a knows indeed less than b, but a considers it possible that ¬(a b), in which case the advantage of b would be less. Possibly a is willing to bet for the latter, even though the former is really the case. This is like playing bridge and noting the signals exchanged between the opponents, that if true may have revealed their better hand of cards, but they may also have been explicitly misinforming you by their signals in order It is of course well possible that each agent has a secret. In Figure 9 for instance, we have
Before looking at an example in CEL, consider the following property:
. This expresses that a does not know ϕ, but anybody who would know even a little bit more would know ϕ. In state u of the example above we have that a does not know that q is false, but b, who knows 'a little bit' more (who considers only the actual state as possible, one less than the two states considered possible by a) knows that q is false. So we have, in u:
This notion of 'knowing even a little bit more' seems of independent interest on infinite models, where the difference between a's ignorance and any other agent's knowledge may be like the difference between a closed set and any open approximation of that set.
Comparative Epistemic Logic with Public Announcements
Being able to locally express that agent a knows at least what agent b knows is especially valuable if one can somehow reason about change of knowledge, allowing one to express that it comes about that one player gets to know at least what another knows. Dynamic epistemic logic ( [27] ) is a powerful formalism to reason about change within the object language. Without going into the details of the logic, we will here focus on a particular case of dynamic epistemic logic, namely public announcements, thereby focus on the semantical aspect of model restriction.
First, consider the two epistemic models in Figure 10 . Call the models M (left) and N (right). Model M represents a situation where three players 1, 2 and 3 each hold a card from a deck of cards Cards = {r, w, b}. A state with a name xyz represents a situation where player 1 holds card x, player 2 holds y and player 3 holds z. We also assume atoms r i , w i , b i (i ≤ 3) where for instance r 2 is true in those situations where 2 holds the red card. Players only see their own card, and not the card of the others (and this is common knowledge). Note that both models are image finite and strongly extensional: the worlds in each model already differ in the valuations. This implies that we can here identify with 'knowing at least as much as', and with 'knowing more'.
In M we have for instance that
I.e., if the deal is rwb, then 1 holds the red card, he knows this, but 2 does not know it, and, finally, 1 knows that 2 does not know that 1 holds the red card.
Since every player knows a fact that the others don't know (i.e., the face of their own card) we also have
which says that the information of players 1 and 2 is incomparable, and 1 knows that 2 does not know more than him: 1 even knows that 2 knows that 2 does not know more than 1.
However, now consider model N , which can be obtained from M as the effect of a public announcement that player 1 does not hold the white card, i.e., ¬w 1 . In other words, N is obtained from M by leaving out all those states where the announcement (that ¬w 1 ) is false. Said differently, N is the result of M when leaving out the states wrb and wbr. The notation for this is N = M |¬w 1 (N is M restricted to the ¬w 1 worlds). We then obtain
This describes the situation that when the card deal is rwb, and somebody announces in public that 1 does not hold the white card, that after that announcement, 3 knows more than 1 and than 2 (they both knew already the fact that is announced), and 1 considers it possible that 2 holds the white card, in which situation 3 2 would hold after the announcement.
Let us now consider a little closer how a system of comparative epistemic logic combined with public announcement logic would look like. First of all, this would involve a language, which we call L CEL+PAL defined as follows: The axiomatization of public announcements in S5 is obtained by so-called reduction axioms (see [27] for a discussion). Those axioms explain how public announcement can be reduced to statements in S5 that do not involve such announcements. For instance, the reduction axiom for knowledge says that [ϕ]K i ψ ('after announcement of ϕ, agent i knows ψ') is equivalent to ϕ → K i [ϕ]ψ. Using this axiom together with the other axioms (for conjunction and negation), we can 'push' the announcements operators [·] 'inside' the subformulas, and eventually, using the axioms for announcement and atoms, get rid of them. This shows that S5 plus public announcements is equivalent to S5 itself.
So if we would be able to come up with a reduction principle for announcements and , we would have a complete logic for a language with knowledge, announcements and the comparison operator . However, there is no reduction axiom for [ϕ]a b. Even stronger, we will now show that by adding public announcements to CEL we obtain a system that is more expressive than CEL itself. Theorem 8. CEL with public announcements is more expressive than CEL.
Proof. We will employ a results about coalitional bisimulations, Theorem 4 (first item). Consider the two models M = W, R, V, I and M = W , R , V , I depicted in Figure 11 : the atoms p is true at states u and u only, and the accessibility relations for the agents a and b can be read off from the figure (note that this is an S5-model: reflexive arrows are not drawn). In other words, although for the language L CEL the models (M, w 1 ) and (M , w 1 ) are the same, in the language L CEL+PAL , we find a formula that distinguishes (M, w 1 ) and (M , w 1 ). So Theorem 8 in effect shows that the elimination process that underlies the semantics of a public announcement, can change the properties between 'similar' models in such a way that they lose their similarity. In particular, where the presence of world w 3 in model M is irrelevant for what is true in w 1 (this is what (9) says), because it 'survives' the announcement ¬p, the presence of w 3 in the resulting model makes that w 1 has more a-successors than b-successors, which would not have been so (in N ) if w 3 was left out in the first place (like in M ). Only Knowing. There is a rich literature on 'only knowing' also in the multiagent context see for instance [13] , the overview paper [26] or the recent [2] . Although related to the issues that CEL addresses, there are also differences: in only knowing, one tries to characterise the minimal amount of knowledge of an agent, given he knows a certain fact ϕ. In CEL, the emphasis is on comparing one agent's knowledge to another agent's.
Conclusion
We have presented a flexible way to deal locally with quantification over formulas. In particular, we have shown how, under some mild conditions, in a modal logic that extends K with some canonical axioms, one can add a number of relational atoms, for each of them an axiom and an inference rule, such that the logic is complete for the class of models that interpret the atom as a first order property of the underlying frame. We argued that this presents many opportunities to express properties concerning the knowledge or beliefs of agents in a local way, so that they are only true now, or as a belief or knowledge of some specific agents.
In more detail we investigated the case of 'comparative epistemic logic', for the relational atom such that a b informally stands for 'b knows at least as much as a'. Although we focussed on epistemic and doxastic logics, our technique is applicable in dynamic settings as well. On our agenda is to study how our framework behaves in a dynamic epistemic logic setting.
